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Abstract Widespread and systematic rape pervaded both the genocides in Bosnia–
Herzegovina in 1992 and in Rwanda in 1994. In response to these conflicts, the
Yugoslav Tribunal (ICTY) and the Rwandan Tribunal (ICTR) were created and
charged with meting justice for crimes committed, including rape. Nevertheless, the
two tribunals differ in their relative success in administering justice for crimes of
rape. Addressing rape has been a consistent element of the ICTY prosecution
strategy, which resulted in gender-sensitive investigative procedures, higher
frequencies of rape indictments, and more successful prosecutions. In contrast, rape
has not been a central focus of the ICTR prosecution strategy, which resulted in a
sporadic approach to gender-sensitive investigative procedures, inconsistent rape
indictments, and few successful prosecutions. What accounts for this disparity in
rape prosecutions between the Rwandan and Yugoslav tribunals? Building off the
existing literature that discusses factors such as legal instruments and resource
capacity of the tribunal, this article argues that transnational advocacy helped
generate the necessary political will to adopt and implement legal norms regarding
crimes of sexual violence at the ICTY and the ICTR. Following the importance of
transnational advocacy as agents of norm change, this paper also explores the
antecedent conditions of advocacy mobilization that conditioned different levels of
mobilization vis-à-vis the ICTY and the ICTR, including media attention and
framing, connections and interest match with local groups, and geopolitical context.
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Introduction
Widespread and systematic sexual violence pervaded both the genocides in Bosnia–
Herzegovina in 1992 and Rwanda in 1994 (Amnesty International 1993a). In
Bosnia–Herzegovina, over 20,000 women were raped in the conflict, including
particularly sadistic rape intended to humiliate the victim, her family and
community, rape with the intention of forced impregnation, and rape as sexual
slavery (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen 1993). In Rwanda, an estimated
250,000 women were raped, oftentimes with accompanying sexual mutilation,
sexual slavery, and forced impregnation (Balthazar 2006; UN Commission on
Human Rights 1996). In response to these conflicts, the UN Security Council
established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in
May 1993 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in November
1994. The ICTY and the ICTR were both charged with prosecuting inter alia
violations of international humanitarian law, including crimes of sexual violence and
rape.
While the ICTY and the ICTR were both given the legal instruments to prosecute
systematic rape abuses, their effectiveness in addressing the crime of rape are varied.
Rape prosecution was a consistent element of the ICTY prosecution strategy, which
resulted in consistent levels of rape indictment charges, convictions, and the
adoption and implementation of gender-sensitive procedures. Since the inception of
the ICTY, the tribunal has convicted 23 individuals of rape and/or sexual assault,
many of them in the Foca case, which was the first international case to exclusively
prosecute sexual violence. In contrast, rape was not a central focus of the ICTR
prosecution strategy, which resulted in inconsistent levels of rape indictments, five
successful convictions that were not overturned on appeal, 13 unsuccessful rape
cases, and a sporadic approach to the adoption of gender-sensitive procedures. A
sexual assault subunit of the investigative team was not created until 3 years after the
establishment of the tribunal, which was subsequently disbanded 4 years later in
2000, and then reinstated in 2003. The ICTR also took 3 years to issue its first rape
indictment. While the Akayesu case—the first case to successfully prosecute rape as
genocide and expand the definition of rape—represents a historical achievement of
the ICTR, the fact that the original indictment did not include rape and was only
amended under public pressure 5 months into the trial demonstrates the lack of
prioritization and focus on rape prosecution at the ICTR.
What accounts for this disparity in rape prosecution? Much of the literature that
informs this question focuses on two areas: appropriate legal instruments to
prosecute crimes of sexual violence and sufficient tribunal resources and adequate
administration (Askin 1997; Goldstone 2001; de Brouwer 2005). While both of
these factors are integral for rape prosecutions, they are not determinative of
outcomes and overlook the agency of actors fostering and implementing new laws
surrounding justice for crimes of sexual violence. Because the issue of conflict rape
and sexual violence has historically been marginalized and conflict rape and
precedential norms of judicial procedure and implementation did not exist prior to
the ICTY, substantial political will was needed to enact changes surrounding
prosecution of conflict rape. In the cases of the ICTY and the ICTR, transnational
advocacy coalitions, such as the Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict
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Situations, helped mobilize and generate the political will to act on the issue of
sexual violence through informational politics, expertise, and direct pressure.
Following the importance of transnational advocacy in generating political will
for rape prosecutions, this article articulates why transnational advocacy groups did
not mobilize around the issue of conflict rape evenly, as seen by different levels of
mobilization against the ICTY and the ICTR. Three antecedent conditions affected
the mobilization of transnational advocacy campaigns for rape prosecution: prior
connections and matched interests with local women’s and human rights groups,
geopolitical factors, and media attention and symbolic framing. Together, these three
antecedent variables conditioned the mobilization of transnational advocacy, and
therefore affected the pressure and leverage transnational advocacy coalitions
exerted upon the ICTY and the ICTR to address conflict rape.
History of Conflict Rape Prosecution
Conflict rape pervades a diversity of types of conflicts—from international wars, to
revolutions, civil wars, pogroms, ethnic cleansing campaigns, and genocides—and
occurs regardless of the ideological justifications for war (Chinkin 1994). Conflict
rape occurred in World War II in the form of the Japanese “comfort women” and the
systematic rape of thousands of women during the siege of Nanking (Chang 1997).
In the 1990 Gulf War, an estimated 5,000 Kuwaiti women were raped by Iraqi
soldiers, and during the noninternational conflict in Peru, women reported being
raped by government soldiers and members of the Shining Path (Chinkin 1994).
While the history of conflict rape is brutal and extensive, conflict rape has
historically been an invisible crime largely absent from international and domestic
criminal prosecution. This is not to say that rape has been absent from the historical
rules of warfare or modern international criminal law. Rules prohibiting wartime
rape date back to the Articles of War written by Richard II of England in 1385 and
span into the seventeenth century writings of Hugo Grotius (Brownmiller 1975).
Nevertheless, the historical prosecution of sexual assault under international criminal
law has not occurred, as represented by the silence about rape at the Nuremberg and
Tokyo Trials, even though cases of sexual assault were thoroughly documented
(Askin 1997).
The absence of post-conflict rape prosecution mutually reinforces the ambiguity
of the international criminal law about sexual assault. Sexual crimes are not clearly
and explicitly demarcated in international criminal law, but are divided between
different categories of abuses and crimes, such as crimes against humanity,
violations of the Geneva Conventions, and most recently as a component of
genocide. Prior to the ICTY, the ICTR, and the International Criminal Court (ICC),
there were no internationally accepted definitions of sex crimes—which include
rape, enforced prostitution, enforced sterilization, enforced impregnation, enforced
maternity, sexual mutilation, and genocidal rape (Askin 1997).
A common historical explanation for this lack of attention to conflict rape views
rape as an unchangeable externality of war or a bonus for soldiers on all sides
(Brownmiller 1975; Chinkin 1994; Farwell 2004). In this argument, sexual assault is
essentialized as a natural component of war and war strategy (Askin 1997). Others
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see conflict rape as a lesser crime than systematic murder—in the cases where the
woman was not raped but killed—and that criminal tribunals should focus on the
killings, not sexual assaults. Another argument posits that sentencing guidelines,
which offer greater punishments for crimes of murder, combined with the difficulty
of investigating sexual crimes and getting the victim to testify, create institutional
incentives not to prosecute rape and sexual violence (Arbour 2003). Feminist theory
also contributes to the discussion about the historical silence surrounding conflict
rape by connecting conflict rape with the larger issues of violence against women
and the gendered societal power structure. Feminist theory argues that violence
against women has often been viewed as falling on the private side of the public/
private dichotomy, which shields it from public investigation, scrutiny, and
prosecution (Bunch 1990; Copelon 1994).1
When discussing the silence surrounding the issue of conflict rape, it is important
to note that international criminal tribunals are but one mechanism of justice within
the larger framework of transitional justice that includes truth commissions or local
courts, such as the Rwandan Gacaca system. International criminal tribunals
represent important venues for public trial of the most egregious crimes committed;
however, by focusing on the major players, many individual crimes are never tried
and many victims never receive justice. In addition, the international criminal
tribunals may not be the preferred justice mechanism for the communities that
experienced the conflict or the survivors of sexual assault. This article focuses on
international criminal tribunals because the ICTY and the ICTR are the pivotal
judicial bodies that broke the historical silence and ambiguity surrounding rape
prosecution and from which precedents and norms about the processes and outcomes
of rape prosecution emerged. Even though both tribunals are historic in their
prosecution of the crime of rape, the outcomes of rape prosecution at the ICTY and
the ICTR dramatically differ. Through case study analysis of the ICTY and the
ICTR, the factors that contribute to this divergence in successful rape prosecutions
can be better understood, which can shed light on unevenness of norm change and
the dialectic between legal instruments and implementation.
Methodology
The research design adopted is an in-depth, narrative case study comparison of the
ICTY and the ICTR. The ICTY and the ICTR represent relevant cases due to their
unique historical positions as the first international criminal tribunals since
Nuremberg and the first international judicial bodies to prosecute the crime of rape.
Additionally, they are comparable cases due their many similarities, such as their ad
hoc establishment by UN Security Council resolutions, the proximity of their
creation—the ICTY was formed in May 1993 and the ICTR was formed in
1 Within feminist theory, debates exist over the normative goal and unintended consequences of
prosecuting crimes of sexual violence through international tribunals, particularly rape as a form of
genocide. Some feminists argue that prosecuting international crimes of sexual violence can reinforce the
problematic concept of vulnerable “women and children” (Engle 2005; Buss 1998, 2002), obscure the
rights and recognition of war-rape orphans (Carpenter 2000), and overshadow post-conflict agendas and
priorities of local women (Nesiah 2006).
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November 1994—their identical rules of evidence, procedure, and appellate
jurisdiction as well as sharing the same appeals court and prosecutor (Barria and
Roper 2005).2
The comparative case study of the ICTY and ICTR is composed of two parts.
First, the respective differences in rape prosecution outcomes are outlined and
various explanations for the differences are evaluated, including the effects of
transnational advocacy. Second, the question of why levels of transnational
mobilization differed between the ICTY and the ICTR is explored. The evidence
to inform the construction of the case studies includes nongovernmental and
governmental reports, written speeches, archival documents of the Women’s Action
Coalition and Amnesty International, newspaper articles, tribunal case documents,
and personal interviews with leaders within transnational advocacy coalitions
advocating on the issue of justice for wartime sexual violence.3 While the available
evidence is limited to public tribunal documents and does not include interviews
with tribunal personnel, the method of using multiple sources of evidence enabled
me to crosscheck major pieces of evidence. Whenever possible, claims by
transnational advocates of their influence on the ICTY and the ICTR were
corroborated by other sources such as tribunal documents, government reports, or
public statements by tribunal personnel. Even with the limitations in evidence and
cautions of interpretation, these case studies confirm the plausibility of the impact of
transnational advocacy on the rape prosecution outcomes at the ICTY and the ICTR.
Conflict Rape in Bosnia–Herzegovina and Rwanda
In Bosnia–Herzegovina, rape was mostly—but not exclusively—inflicted upon
Muslim women by Serbian paramilitaries as one element of a systematic campaign
to form an ethnically homogeneous territory between Serbia and the Serbian areas of
occupied Bosnia–Herzegovina and Croatia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen
1993; de Brouwer 2005). The European Commission investigation found that rape
was not just a byproduct of conflict, but was intentionally and systematically used to
demoralize and terrorize communities as well as remove populations from their
homes (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen 1993). An estimated 20,000 women
and girls were raped in Bosnia–Herzegovina during the conflict, and oftentimes in
particularly sadistic and humiliating ways that included mutilation, gang rape, and
public rape. Rape, sexual enslavement, and forced impregnation and maternity were
combined in the form of “rape camps,” where women and girls were forcibly
enslaved in abandoned schools, sports centers, and cafes to be continually raped,
2 The ICTY and the ICTR shared the same prosecutor until 2003 when the Tribunals retained separate
prosecutors. At that time, Carla del Ponte remained the prosecutor of the ICTY and Hassan Jallow became
the prosecutor of the ICTR.
3 Interviews were requested with eight prominent leaders from various organizations actively involved in
the campaign for the international criminal prosecution of wartime rape in the 1990s. From these eight
requests, I conducted interviews on September 12, 2008 with two leaders from different organizations.
The personal identity and organizational affiliation of the interviewees were kept anonymous, as the
interviewees had professional relationships with ICTY/ICTR personnel and worked within a small
professional community where organizational affiliation would reveal their personal identity.
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sometimes impregnated, and if impregnated, forcibly detained until labor to prevent
abortion and deliver “Serb children” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen
1993). The abuses committed in these rape camps not only included rape, but many
women and young girls also died as a result of sexual injuries or mutilation,
attempted suicide, murder, or disappearance (Stiglmayer 1994).
In Rwanda, widespread and systematic rape was committed almost exclusively
against Tutsi women and girls—although some Hutu women married to Tutsi men
were targeted—as a component of the genocidal acts to exterminate the Tutsi
population. The perpetrators of rapes were the Hutu militia, the Interahamwe, as
well as military soldiers of the Rwandan Armed Forces and civilians (de Brouwer
2005). Rape was an instrument to strip the humanity from the larger ethnic and
community groups to which women belonged (Nowrojee 1996). An estimated
250,000 women and girls were raped in the Rwandan genocide, often in particularly
sadistic and brutal ways (UN Commission on Human Rights 1996).4 Women were
gang raped, raped in public, held in sexual slavery, sexually mutilated, and raped
with sharpened objects such as sticks and rifles (Balthazar 2006). Forced
impregnation was also a result of the rapes and an estimated 2,000 to 5,000 children
were born of rape (UN Commission on Human Rights 1996).
Rape Prosecution at the ICTY
Although prosecuting rape was not an initial priority of the ICTY,5 in short time it
became an integral part of the overall prosecution strategy, which is reflected in the
tribunal’s gender-sensitive policies and procedures, sustained level of rape indict-
ments, and successful prosecution of rape. In terms of adoption of gender-sensitive
policies at the ICTY, the initial chief prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, appointed
Patricia Viseur Sellers as “Legal Advisor for Gender-related Crimes” to the Office of
the Prosecution to formulate a prosecution approach to rape and other sex crimes at
both the ICTY and the ICTR (Copelon 2000; Engle 2005). While technically this
position was to inform both the prosecution strategies of the ICTY and the ICTR, the
position was located at The Hague, the location of the ICTY, and Sellers’s influence
on the ICTR was limited.
[S]he could only do so much and she did what she could...because she was not
based in Rwanda, she was not able to really get a constant and present role in
Rwanda or in the ICTR...ultimately I think it was recognized that the job was
too big for one person and...she was made the Gender Advisor for the
Yugoslav Tribunal and Rwanda was left without a Gender Advisor.6
4 It is impossible to know the exact number of rapes committed during and immediately following the
Rwandan genocide. This estimation of the number of rapes derives from expert calculations based upon
the number of children born of rape.
5 Campbell (2007) states that the ICTY did not initially undertake legal proceedings for the crime of rape
because of logistical difficulties (i.e., monitoring, amending indictments, and the necessity of having
closed sessions) and the changing prosecutorial strategies of the Office of the Prosecutor.
6 Anonymous leader within women’s human rights movement, Interview with author, September 12,
2008.
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In terms of investigation procedures, the ICTY immediately established a
Victims and Witness Protection Unit as specified by the tribunal procedures to
provide counseling and support in cases of sexual assault. The ICTY also
established Rule 96 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, an extremely
progressive set of procedures specifically for cases of sexual assault. Rule 96 states
that corroboration of victim’s testimony is not necessary, consent does not apply as
a defense if the victim was threatened or under duress, consent as a defense must
be prescreened by the judge for validity and credibility prior to being heard in open
court, and that the prior sexual history of the victim is not admissible (ICTY Rules
and Procedures).
At the ICTY, there have been sustained levels of rape indictments and substantial
numbers of rape prosecutions resulting in convictions that withstood appeal.
Approximately 20% of all indictment charges included allegations of sexual assault
(Campbell 2007). As of 2008, the ICTY convicted 23 people of rape or sexual
assault as a crime against humanity or violations of the Geneva Conventions.
These convictions have also withstood appeal, which speaks to their solid
evidentiary and legal foundations. In all, only two cases out of 75 indictments
and 25 completed cases for rape and/or sexual assault at the ICTY have not
resulted in convictions.
The ICTY, for the first time in history, prosecuted a case focused exclusively on
sexual assault. The Foca case, otherwise known as the “the rape case,” is a case with
three defendants (Kunarac, Kovac, Vukovic) that the Office of the Prosecution
intentionally constructed to focus exclusively on sexual crimes committed against
women in one location, Foca, in order to break new legal ground on rape prosecution
(Barkan 2002). The Foca case charged eight Bosnian Serb police and military
officers—the tribunal was only able to detain three—with detaining and enslaving
women and girls and subjecting them to constant rape, sexual assault, and torture.
All three Foca defendants were found guilty—combined their convictions, which
include rape as a form of torture, a war crime, means of persecution, crime against
humanity, and enslavement as a crime against humanity (Prosecutor v. Kunarac,
Kovac, & Vukovic 1996).
Rape Prosecution at the ICTR
Rape prosecution has not been an integral part of the prosecution strategy at the
ICTR, which resulted in intermittent adoption of gender-sensitive policies,
inconsistent levels of rape indictments, and few rape convictions. Rape prosecution
has not been completely absent from the ICTR; the Akayesu case is a landmark case
that expanded the definition of rape and successfully prosecuted rape as genocide.
Nevertheless, this case represents an anomaly within the larger pattern of neglect and
silence about issues of sexual violence and rape.
At the ICTR, gender-sensitive policies have been intermittent in adoption and
implementation. Not until 1996, 2 years after the ICTR’s establishment and at the
end of the tenure of the first chief prosecutor Richard Goldstone, was a sexual
assault unit of the investigative team of the Office of the Prosecutor created. The
sexual assault unit consisted of three officers, one psychologist, one nurse, two
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lawyers, two policewomen, and one policeman and was charged with preparing
victims for testimony, working with NGOs, and providing safe travel for witnesses
(UN Commission on Human Rights 1998). In 2000, the third chief prosecutor, Carla
Del Ponte, dismantled the sexual assault unit. However, at the end of her term in
2003, when she was seeking a second term and was under pressure from women’s
groups, the sexual assault unit was reinstated. Apart from the sexual assault unit,
investigators at the ICTR received no training in interviewing rape victims, most of
the investigators were male, and many investigators espoused the belief that rape is
not worthy of investigation (Nowrojee 2005).
As with the ICTY, the ICTR Rules of Prosecution and Evidence provides for
creation of a Victims and Witness Protection Unit; however, a witness protection
program was not created until 1997–1998, almost 4 years after the tribunal’s
inception (MADRE 1997; UN Commission on Human Rights 1998). Investigators at
the ICTR also misrepresented privacy protection to women in order to facilitate
getting testimony at trial by not telling the victim that her name would be given to
the defense team. Besides the betrayal of institutional trust that this creates, women
are often at risk for reprisals for testifying or encounter hostility by her family or
community, who may not know that she was raped. One rape victim, who testified
on the basis of confidentiality, had her testimony leaked, and she was subsequently
left by her fiancée after returning from Arusha because of the stigma of her rape
(Coalition for Women's Human Rights in Conflict Situations 2002; Nowrojee 2005).
In the Butare case, sensitivity to sexual crimes was also lacking. During one
defendant’s trial, a victim of rape was asked 1,194 questions by the defense, with
many of the questions repeating detailed aspects of the rape. In addition, rape
victims were asked offensive questions such as if the victim had bathed—implying
that she could not have been raped if she smelled (Nowrojee 2005).
At the ICTR, levels of rape indictments have been inconsistent, and rape
convictions have been few and have almost overwhelmingly been overturned on
appeal or dropped in plea agreements. Overall, rape indictments of the ICTR
represent approximately 30% of the total number of indictments, slightly higher than
that of the ICTY (Balthazar 2006; Nowrojee 2005). When disaggregated and
examined closer, the comparison loses strength. During the first 3 years of the
tribunal during the tenure of chief prosecutor Richard Goldstone, no rape
indictments occurred and rape was not included in the general prosecutorial strategy
of the tribunal.
Richard Goldstone... gave a lot of lip service to the idea of prosecuting rape,
but actually under his watch not a single indictment included sexual violence...
he didn’t set up his investigative team in such a way that they examined this
issue. I think that they set the tone for very sloppy work that ultimately
followed.7
The first rape indictment of the ICTR did not occur until 1997, 3 years after the
establishment of the tribunal and only after significant pressure to amend the
indictment (UN Commission on Human Rights 1998; Breton-Le Goff 2002). During
7 Anonymous leader within women’s human rights movement, Interview with author, September 12,
2008.
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the tenure of chief prosecutor Louise Arbour, almost all new indictments included
charges of sexual assault or rape (Balthazar 2006; Nowrojee 2005). This figure is
misleading because rape charges were added to indictments in identical language,
which essentially blanketed indictments with rape charges that could not be
successfully prosecuted without amendment and extensive investigation.
Under her [Prosecutor Arbour] watch there’s a sexual assault team, there are
efforts to begin to collect rape victim’s testimony...there are amendments to
many indictments to add rape charges but without proper investigation...but the
work hasn’t properly been done to ensure the adequate evidence is there.8
The next chief prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, reversed any gains made by
Prosecutor Arbour, and sexual violence was once again marginalized.
Del Ponte... makes it very clear that sexual violence isn’t high on her priority
list. And you find that by the end of Carla Del Ponte’s time in office, zero
percent of the new indictments contain rape... she basically dismantles the
sexual violence team till it basically does nothing.9
In terms of rape indictments, Hasson Jallow, the last chief prosecutor, has
followed the general pattern of marginalization of the issue of sexual violence.
Jallow is closing up shop... and doing a salvage job. And so there is very little
commitment to do, and the ability at this late point in these trials, to begin to
dramatically change the legacy, the negative legacy of sexual violence
prosecution for the ICTR.10
In terms of rape convictions, a total of five rape convictions as a crime against
humanity, as a form of genocide (Akayesu), and as a violation of the Geneva
Conventions have survived appeal. When viewed in comparative terms, 25% of
completed rape cases resulted in successful convictions at the ICTR and 92% of
completed rape cases resulted in successful convictions at the ICTY (see Table 1).
While this contrast is markedly different, the disparity of rape convictions is even
more exaggerated when rape conviction statistics are discussed relative to the
number of rapes that occurred in the conflicts. There were more than 20 times as
many rapes during the genocide in Rwanda than occurred in Bosnia:
approximately 20,000 women were raped in the genocide in Bosnia and
approximately 250,000 women were raped in the Rwandan genocide. In addition
to the lower number of the successful prosecutions at the ICTR, the most
troubling trend is the rate of unsuccessful rape convictions, which arise either by
a not guilty verdict, being overturned on appeal or by dropping the rape charges
in a plea arrangement. This speaks of the lack of prosecutorial political will and
8 Anonymous leader within women’s human rights movement, Interview with author, September 12,
2008.
9 Anonymous leader within women’s human rights movement, Interview with author, September 12,
2008.
10 Anonymous leader within women’s human rights movement, Interview with author, September 12,
2008.
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investigative procedures to back up the indictments with solid legal and evidentiary
foundations.
The most notable and precedential case of the five successful cases prosecuted by
the ICTR is the Akayesu case. The Akayesu case is widely lauded for its historical
precedent in successfully prosecuting rape as an instrument of genocide and
providing an expansive and precedential definition of rape that expands it beyond
penetration and takes into account the coercive circumstances of armed conflict
(Askin 1999). Nevertheless, the circumstances leading to this historical conclusion
reflect the inattention to rape of the ICTR’s prosecution strategy. The original 12
indictments of the Akayesu case did not include rape or sexual violence. The rape
and sexual violence indictments were not added until 5 months into the trial
(Prosecutor v. Akayesu 1996).
Even after the historic success of the Akayesu case, the ICTR failed to adequately
incorporate rape into its prosecution strategy. In the Kajelijeli case, the defendant was
convicted of genocide, but acquitted of rape. Because there was a dissenting opinion
on the rape charge, the chances for successful appeal on the rape charge were high, but
the prosecutor failed to file the paperwork on time, and subsequently relinquished the
right to appeal (Nowrojee 2005; Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli 1998). As the ICTR reaches
its final phase—the trials are slated to end in 2008 and the tribunal is to shut down in
2010—rape charges may be the first thing dropped in plea agreements as
demonstrated by the Bisengimana case (Prosecutor v. Bisengimana 2000).
Legal Instruments
Much of the literature discussing conflict rape prosecution focuses on the legal
instrumental mechanisms under which rape can be prosecuted (Askin 1997; de
Brouwer 2005). These legal instruments—including crimes against humanity, grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and genocide—represent legal regimes or
Table 1 Comparison of the ICTY and the ICTR in indictments and convictions of rape/sexual assault as
“Rape as a Crime Against Humanity” or “Torture as a Crime Against Humanity,” “Other Inhumane Acts,
Persecutions on Political, Racial or Religious Grounds,” or “Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions
of 1949” or “Rape as Genocide”
ICTY ICTR
Total indictments 75 42
Awaiting judgment 50 (67%) 22 (52%)
Cases completed 25 (33%) 20 (48%)
Convictions (not overturned on appeal) 23 (92%) 5 (25%)
Unsuccessful (not guilty verdict, pleaded out to charges other than rape, and
convictions overturned on appeal)
2 (8%) 13 (65%)
Other (transfer to federal courts) 2 (1%)
Sources: International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (www.un.org/icty) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (http://69.94.11.53). Descriptive statistics are current as of
July 2008.
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umbrellas under which rape can be prosecuted (Askin 1997). These legal regimes are
not mutually exclusive, but embody different authorities of prosecution and
standards of evidence, which can apply to the different contexts and circumstances
of sexual crimes.
In terms of legal instruments articulated in the statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR,
the instruments are nearly identical. The ICTY statute allows for rape prosecution
under grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, violations of the laws or
customs of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity. However, only under crimes
against humanity is rape specifically listed (UN Secretary-General 1993). The ICTR
statute allows for rape prosecution under violations of the Geneva Conventions of
1949 and Additional Protocol, genocide, and crimes against humanity. Rape is
explicitly listed under two regimes—crimes against humanity and violations of the
Geneva Conventions (ICTR 1994). Although legal capacities to prosecute are
necessary for rape prosecutions, the legal mechanisms articulated within the ICTY
and the ICTR do not vary significantly enough to warrant the divergence in the
resultant rape prosecutions of each Tribunal.
Funding/Tribunal Administration
Two areas in which the ICTY and the ICTR significantly varied were their relative
funding from the United Nations and the level of functionality of their
administration. In the first few years of operation, the ICTY received almost double
the funding of the ICTR—the ICTY spent about $75 million and the ICTR spent
about $42 million (Neuffer 1996). In addition to receiving fewer monetary resources,
the ICTR was also plagued with gross administration failures and mismanagement.
An audit report of the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services detailed
large shortcomings in all areas of the Tribunal, especially with the Registry and
Office of the Prosecutor. These shortcomings included incomplete and unreliable
financial records, payroll problems, underqualified staff and staff vacancies,
inadequate security and witness protection, and lack of leadership (UN Office of
Internal Oversight Services 1997).
There is obviously a direct linkage between a structured, functioning tribunal
administration with adequate resources and the prosecutorial outcomes of said
tribunal, including rape prosecutions. Nevertheless, limited or scarce resources are
not determinative of all prosecutorial outcomes evenly. The process of choosing
how to allocate limited resources can be very political as well as pragmatic.
Because of the lack of rape prosecution precedents and procedures coupled with
the difficulty in investigating rape, crimes of sexual violence may be overlooked in
prosecutorial strategies. At the ICTR, the resources and administrative inadequa-
cies conditioned the overall level and quality of rape prosecutions, yet a resource-
driven explanation does not tell the whole story: the Akayesu case, a great success
of the ICTR in prosecuting rape as genocide, occurred in spite of great
administrative failings and limited resources. In a resource-scarce environment,
the political will to prosecute sexual crimes must be even greater in order to
overcome the pragmatic reasoning and historical precedent that can relegate sexual
crimes invisible.
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Transnational Advocacy Networks and Coalitions
If legal instruments and resources are necessary but not determinative of justice for
crimes of sexual violence, then what generates the spark of change that alters the
norms of invisibility? How is the necessary political will generated to adopt and
implement new norms? In the case of the ICTY and the ICTR, sustained
mobilization of transnational advocacy groups helped generate the political will
necessary for implementation of legal instruments and gender-sensitive procedures.
The tactics employed to generate this political will included informational politics,
symbolic politics and framing, demonstrations, direct legal intervention through
amicus briefs, and working with receptive actors within the tribunals.
Transnational advocacy networks are “actors working internationally on an issue,
who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges
of information and services” (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 1). These networks may
include NGOs, international NGOs, advocacy groups, foundations, the media, and
local social movements and are “characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and
horizontal patterns of communication and exchange” (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 8).
Transnational advocacy networks utilize informational politics, symbolic politics and
framing, leverage, and accountability politics in order to promote norm adoption,
implementation, and policy change (Keck and Sikkink 1998).
In the case of the advocacy pressure against the ICTY and the ICTR, transnational
advocacy coalitions of women’s and human rights organizations joined together to
alter the prevailing norm of conflict rape as an invisible crime. This cooperative
effort occurred during the early 1990s, a period when women’s issues—particularly
violence against women—began to be considered within a human rights frame
(Keck and Sikkink 1998; Thompson 2002). This shift is exemplified by human
rights organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, establishing divisions and
projects that focused on women’s rights (Thompson 2002). The conflicts in the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the creation of the ICTY and the ICTR
coincided with the movement of women’s rights as human rights and a burgeoning
coalition of transnational advocacy of women’s and human rights networks, which
provided the opportunity, connections, and resources to break the historical silence
surrounding conflict rape.
Transnational Advocacy and the ICTY
Transnational advocacy networks working on behalf of rape victims pressured the
ICTY throughout the entire process, from the formation of the tribunal to individual
rape prosecution cases. As the UN Security Council decided to create the ICTY,
women’s groups and human rights groups began to mobilize to ensure that sexual
crimes were adequately addressed at the tribunal. Concerned women’s and human
rights groups formed the Ad Hoc Women’s Coalition Against War Crimes in the
former Yugoslavia—which included Equality Now, Amnesty International, the Fund
for Feminist Majority, Women’s Action Coalition, the Center for Women’s Global
Leadership, and the Center for Reproductive Policy and Law—to pressure the
international legal system to act in response to the rape crimes committed (Lewin
1993). On March 8, 1993, International Women’s Day, the Women’s Action
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Coalition, and the Women’s Coalition against Ethnic Cleansing organized a march in
Los Angeles in protest of the widespread rapes of Bosnian Muslim women (Moon
2008). The Women’s Action Coalition also held weekly vigils outside the United
Nations in order to demonstrate solidarity with the Women in Black Against the War,
a women’s group protesting the war in Belgrade (Women’s Action Coalition). In
spring of 1993, MADRE organized the “Mother Courage II: Emergency Response to
the Crisis in the Former Yugoslavia,” a national tour where Yugoslav women
discussed their experiences in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia (MADRE 1993).
In addition to demonstrations, women’s advocacy groups organized massive letter
writing campaigns and raised funds to aid rape survivors in Bosnia. The Women’s
Action Coalition, in conjunction with rape crisis centers in the U.S. and the Bosnian
Red Cross, raised funds and sent rape crisis volunteers to Bosnia to conduct trainings
(Women's Action Coalition 1993). Pamphlets by the Women’s Action Coalition
included lists of contact information of prominent UN officials and U.S.
congresspeople, senators, and the president along with pleas to contact them and
advocate on behalf of rape victims. Also enclosed in one pamphlet was a red,
metallic sticker with “RAPE” in white block letters to be adhered to STOP signs
(Women's Action Coalition). It is difficult to know with certainty whether letters
from this campaign directly contributed to changes in policy or awareness about the
rapes in Bosnia; nevertheless a letter from Senator Daniel P. Moynihan of New York
to Ms. Janet Wright dated May 27, 1993 discusses his decision to endorse Senate
Resolution 35, which condemned the ethnic cleansing and rapes in Bosnia–
Herzegovina.
Knowing of your interest regarding Senate Resolution 35 concerning
systematic rape in the former Yugoslavia, I am providing you with a legislative
update. This past November I traveled to Croatia and Bosnia. What is going on
there is virtual genocide. And among the most heinous of the war crimes being
committed daily is the rape of Bosnian women. A report by the European
Community investigative team estimates over 20,000 women have been raped
since the violence began in the former Yugoslavia. [paragraph] Let us be clear.
This is a moral outrage, but it is more. It is a crime. In order to emphasize how
strongly I feel about this shocking conduct, I joined my colleagues as a co-
sponsor of Senate Resolution 35, a condemnation of the Serbian aggression
and systematic rape in particular. Be assured that I will continue to speak out
against these grave violations of international law and to encourage the
Administration to take strong action to bring these crimes to an end (Moynihan
1993).
In addition to drawing awareness and attention to the issue of conflict rape, the
advocacy campaign also directly shaped the ways in which the burgeoning tribunal
addressed sexual violence. In 1993, an international call for “Gender Justice,”
written by the International Women’s Human Rights Clinic of CUNY Law School,
was sent to the Secretary-General of the UN, the UN Commission of Experts, the
UN Security Council, and the UN Office of Legal Counsel (Green et al. 1994). This
memorandum argued that the creation of the ICTY presented an opportunity to go
beyond recognizing sexual violence as a violation of international criminal law and
to successfully prosecute rape and sexual violence.
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In 1993—after the ICTY was established—women’s and human rights groups
also lobbied the tribunal to adopt rules and procedures that would enable successful
rape prosecutions. An open process of rule making allowed states and NGOs to help
formulate the rules and procedures of the ICTY (Copelon 2000). A subgroup of the
Task Force for Accountability for War Crimes in the Balkans led by the International
Women’s Human Rights Law Clinic of CUNY Law School and staff and students at
the Harvard Law School Human Rights Program drafted a submission of rules and
procedures to the ICTY relating to crimes of sexual assault. The rules that were
adopted included those pertaining to the protection of victims and witnesses,
specifically the creation of a victim and witnesses unit and the rules on evidence in
cases of sexual assault (Green et al. 1994). More specifically, the progressive Rule
96 of the ICTY regarding evidentiary rules for crimes of sexual violence appears
derived from the proposed rules—four of the five proposed rules are included in
Rule 96 (Green et al. 1994; ICTY 2010). Feminist groups also organized around the
election of the two female nominees, Gabrielle Kirk McDonald and Elizabeth Odio-
Benito, for tribunal judgeships—both nominees were subsequently approved (Green
et al. 1994).
Once the tribunal began operation, women’s and human rights groups engaged in
letter writing campaigns, media work, protests, and conferences to pressure the
ICTY to address sexual crimes (Barkan 2002; Green et al. 1994). In an assessment
written by Richard Goldstone, the first chief prosecutor of the ICTY and the ICTR,
he writes of the immediate pressure placed upon him by advocacy groups to address
the crimes of rape and sexual violence.
From my very first week in office, from the middle of August, 1994 onwards, I
began to be besieged with petitions and letters, mainly from women’s groups,
but also from human rights groups generally, from many European countries,
the United States and Canada, and also from non-governmental organizations
in the former Yugoslavia. Letters and petitions expressing concern and begging
for attention, adequate attention, to be given to gender related crimes,
especially systematic rape as a war crime. Certainly if any campaign worked,
this one worked in my case, because it definitely made me much more
sensitive, concerned and determined that something should be done about the
proper investigation of allegations of mass rape in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda (Goldstone 1996, 234).
Sustained pressure on the ICTY by women’s and human rights organizations also
included more direct intervention in tribunal cases through the submission of amicus
curiae or “friend of the court” briefs. These briefs are filed with the court but can be
written by public, nonaffiliated entities and can act as a form of public pressure to
address rape and sexual crimes. The first two amicus briefs were submitted by the
Blaustein Institute, the Women’s International Human Rights Clinic, and the Harvard
University Human Rights Program in response to the first papers that chief
prosecutor Goldstone filed with the ICTY, which downplayed the rape of female
prisoners in an Omarska prison and focused more on beatings of male prisoners
(Barkan 2002; Copelon 2000). In response to the amicus briefs and with the support
of Judge Odio-Benito, a motion that addressed the rapes of female prisoners was
granted (Copelon 2000). Two amicus briefs were also filed by women’s and human
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rights groups in the Tadic case to support witness protection measures and two more
were filed in the Furundzija case to counter the defense lawyer’s claim that the rape
victim’s condition of post-traumatic stress disorder limited the credibility of her
testimony (Copelon 2000).
Transnational Advocacy and the ICTR
Transnational advocacy networks pressuring for rape prosecution did not mobilize
around the ICTR to the extent that they mobilized around the ICTY. Transnational
advocacy networks did not actively pressure the ICTR until 2 years after the
establishment of the tribunal. This is not to say that transnational advocacy was
absent, but it was slow to mobilize and never generated the broad-base mobilization
that surrounded the issue of rape in Bosnia. Because of this, the campaign was never
able to generate the sustained advocacy to force the ICTR to produce the political
will to shift the default strategy from marginalization and devaluation of sexual
violence prosecution.
Initially, human rights groups assumed that the gains made within the ICTY about
sexual violence would travel to the ICTR, especially since the two tribunals shared
the same prosecutor.
So you had the prosecutor for the ICTY also being the prosecutor for the ICTR,
Richard Goldstone. You had him making very strong statements about the fact
that rape could constitute a war crime and that they were committed to doing
so. So, it was a very exciting time from the perspective of gender justice... The
Yugoslav tribunal was really the first time that mass rape and crimes against
women were going to be recognized as international crimes. And we just
assumed that these gains would carry over to the Rwanda tribunal. [W]e started
watching the Rwanda tribunal and it was becoming clear that they were not
paying attention to this issue, and that it was not being included in the
investigation work that was underway.11
In 1996, following the recognition that the attention and prioritization of sexual
assault at the ICTY would not carry over to the ICTR, transnational advocacy
networks engaged in two ways. First, the Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in
Conflict Situations, a group of sixty organizations, organically formed following an
unsuccessful letter writing campaign of disparate groups to pressure the ICTR to
enact gender-sensitive policies (Coalition for Women's Human Rights in Conflict
Situations 2009). In addition, Human Rights Watch sent a team of individuals to
Rwanda to obtain documentation regarding systematic sexual assault during the
genocide since little information existed at that time. This documentation of sexual
assault was subsequently transmitted to the ICTR, but did not result in any policy
changes at the tribunal (Nowrojee 1996).
In 1997, external advocacy and internal advocacy within the tribunal converged to
prompt an amendment to the Akayesu indictment to include charges of sexual
assault. In terms of internal advocacy, Judge Pillay—the only female judge hearing
11 Anonymous leader within women’s human rights movement, Interview with author, September 12,
2008.
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the case—asked that the trial be postponed for the prosecutor’s office to investigate
rape after inquiring about rape from a witness during the trial (Copelon 2000; Buss
2002). Following this questioning by Judge Pillay, external advocacy led by the
International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development submitted an
amicus brief to the ICTR pressuring the tribunal to amend the indictment of Jean-
Paul Akayesu to include rape and to ensure the prosecution of sexual violence
(International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development 1997). In
response to this advocacy, a rape charge was added to the indictment of Akayesu,
and the evidence of sexual violence and rape proved some of the strongest in helping
convict Akayesu of genocide, including rape as genocide (Copelon 2000).
Following the amicus brief in the Akayesu case, transnational advocacy groups
were never again able to recreate the convergence of advocacy and political will that
would lead to comprehensive changes in addressing sexual violence at the ICTR.
Yet, transnational advocacy coalitions continued to mobilize vis-à-vis the ICTR on
the issue of sexual violence. In 2001, another amicus brief was submitted by the
Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Armed Conflict Situations in the Cyangugu
case to amend the indictment to include rape (Coalition for Women's Human Rights
in Conflict Situations 2010). This case represented a very similar case to the Akayesu
case in terms of having the support of women’s groups and witnesses willing to
testify to sexual violence.12 Chief prosecutor Carla del Ponte filed a response to the
amicus brief asking the court to deny it, which it subsequently did. A leader within
the advocacy movement stated in response to the lack of political will to prosecute
sexual violence after the Akayesu case:
[M]aybe there wasn’t a perceived need on the side of the tribunal to do this
again... because they could have done it in the case of Cyangugu... Akayesu
was the first one... maybe one sexual violence conviction like the Akayesu
case is considered to be sufficient and so there’s no need to go and seek
others.13
Transnational Advocacy Mobilization: The Media, Geopolitical Location, and Local
Movements
If transnational advocacy mobilization has the potential to spark the will to adopt
and implement laws relating to crimes of sexual violence, then understanding the
derivative causes of differing levels of transnational mobilization vis-à-vis each
Tribunal can further explain the divergence in rape prosecutions. Building off
existing literature, this article argues that three antecedent variables create the
conditions for transnational advocacy: media and advocacy groups engaging in
information politics, the framing of the issue of rape to utilize or overcome
geopolitical location, and interest alignment coupled with connections with local
organizations and movements.
12 Anonymous leader within women’s human rights movement, Interview with author, September 12,
2008.
13 Anonymous 2 leader within women’s human rights movement, Interview with author, September 12,
2008.
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The Media and Informational Politics
For most movements—including transnational advocacy campaigns—mobilization
hinges on their reaching out to preexisting and potential supporters through public
discourse (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993). The media represents an integral part of the
creation of public discourse. The relationship between the media and movements is
not solely unidirectional, where the media acts only as a conduit for information
dissemination, but it can also be two-way (Ron et al. 2005). Informational politics,
or these exchanges and interpretations of information, is integral for mobilization of
transnational advocacy campaigns by providing facts and testimony that denote
blame and symbolically frame the issue (Keck and Sikkink 1998). The media’s role
in information politics contributes to the crafting of the narrative of the problem,
including the facts on the ground, who is to blame, and what should be done about
it. When successful, the widespread dissemination of this narrative—through the
codirectional channel of the media and advocacy organizations—creates awareness
and stimulates debate, mobilization, and action.
In the case of Bosnia, the media actively engaged in informational politics by
gathering and disseminating information and constructing a narrative about the
widespread rapes and rape camps. The initial media reports on rape in Bosnia (in the
summer of 1992) were largely ignored, but the continuous reports eventually
sparked further governmental investigations, public debate, and mobilization by
women’s and human rights groups on the issue (Stanley 1999). In the 18-month
period between April 1992 (when the mass rapes began) and September 1993
(6 months after the creation of the ICTY), 139 media stories ran in major world
publications with “rape” in Bosnia in the headline of the story.14 The media reports
ran continuously from July 1992 through the entire 18-month period covered in the
analysis and ranged in types of stories from editorials about intervention to stop the
rapes, an op-ed piece by Geraldine Ferraro, harrowing testimonials by survivors of
rape camps, discussions about rape as a weapon of war, Vatican pronouncements
about the use of birth control for nuns living in the former Yugoslavia, and
international adoption policies for the children born of rape. During this time, Ms.
Magazine featured the testimonials of three Bosnian rape survivors, which were later
reprinted in the op-ed section of the New York Times and were mirrored in many
other publications including Newsweek and the Philadelphia Inquirer Magazine.
Public documents released by Amnesty International about Bosnia during 1993–
1994 parallel the media’s coverage of the Bosnian rapes. During this time, Amnesty
International released 20 public documents about Bosnia—including country
dossiers, newsletter articles, press releases, and reports—of which eight mentioned
rape and four solely focused on rape (Amnesty International 1993b). Viewed in
percentage terms, 60% of all public documents released by Amnesty International
about Bosnia–Herzegovina during this time discussed the mass rapes. This mirrored
relationship between Amnesty and the media speaks to the codirectionality and
mutually reinforcing exchanges of information within the transnational advocacy
14 The source of this information is from LexisNexis and the classification of “Major World Publication”
is taken directly from LexisNexis. See: http://www.lexisone.com/legalresearch/lnbcc/contentlistings/
newspeople_c.html for a comprehensive list of all publications included in this classification.
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network. It also suggests an informational momentum that contributed to sustained
awareness and subsequent demands for action and mobilization.
In contrast to the profusion of media attention to the rapes in Bosnia, only eight
media stories with headlines of “rape” about the Rwandan genocide appeared in
major world publications in the 18-month period between April 1994 (the beginning
of the conflict) and September 1995 (11 months after the creation of the ICTR). All
of these eight media stories discussed the widespread rapes during the genocide
through the subject of the thousands of children born of rape. In addition, all stories
were reported between February and August of 1995, which is about 9 months after
the genocidal period and coincides with the birth of the children born of the rapes.
During 1994–1995, Amnesty International’s public document releases also reflect
the silence of the rapes during the Rwanda genocide. None of the 32 documents
regarding Rwanda mention rape (Amnesty International 1994). The media attention
about the widespread rapes in Rwanda was almost negligible, occurred markedly
after the fact, and only through the discussion of children of rape, and thus never
garnered the sustained momentum to create widespread awareness and the demand
for action that pulsed through the media campaign about the rapes in Bosnia.
Geopolitical Location and Information Politics
The media not only draws attention to the conflict and disseminates information, but
also interprets events and constructs narratives of the conflict, often drawing on
existing frames or narratives. Frames generalize grievances into broader claims as
well as construct shared identities (Tarrow 1998). Through utilization of frames, the
conflict event derives meaning from the larger narrative it becomes embedded within
(Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993). These frames may be cocreated with transnational
advocacy networks or transnational advocacy networks may work within frames
created by the media because the frames resonate with political allies and facilitate
mobilization (Carpenter 2005).
One frame that the rapes in Bosnia were embedded within is the larger analogy
of the genocide in Bosnia to the Holocaust and the Nazi concentration camps. Out of
the 139 media articles that discuss the rapes in Bosnia, 20 of them directly reference
the Nazis, the Holocaust, or death camps. This analogy not only pertains to the mass
killings in Bosnia but also extends to the rape camps and their similarity to the Nazi
“joy division” of female concentration-camp inmates where mass rapes occurred
(Branson 1993). In another newspaper article, the efforts of feminist advocates in the
former Yugoslavia to stop the genocide and widespread rapes are likened to
courageous anti-Nazi resistors who fought against the destructive aspects of
unchecked nationalism (Landsberg 1993).
While the analogy between the Holocaust and the genocide in Bosnia may be apt
in many ways, using this analogy, or framing the conflict as akin to the Holocaust,
attaches meaning to the conflict in Bosnia beyond merely reporting information.
When embedded within this Holocaust narrative, the Bosnian conflict evokes the
guilt and historical memory of the horrific consequences of delayed world action and
the promises of “never again” occurring again in Europe. In essence, using this
analogy frames the killings and mass rapes in Bosnia as an issue that demands and
requires world attention and action.
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In examining how the Holocaust analogy frame was successfully utilized and
perpetuated in the media surrounding the Bosnian conflict, the geopolitical location
of Bosnia cannot be overlooked. Informational politics does not emerge evenly
across issues or within issues but takes place within value-laden contexts of national
interest, national historical relationships, and implicit and explicit racism. While it is
important to recognize the positive aspects of informational politics on mobilization
described by Keck and Sikkink (1998, 1999), geopolitical factors, and values can
underlie the lopsided attention and mobilization given to similar causes. In the most
extreme depiction of this lopsidedness, Bob (2002) likens global civil society to a
dog-eat-dog, Darwinian marketplace, where groups fight for attention, money, and
sympathy. In this competitive marketplace, many groups are overlooked and never
gain access to key media centers in order to garner the necessary attention to muster
mobilization and action Bob (2002).
In the case of the drastically uneven nature of the media attention and subsequent
advocacy mobilization around the issue of conflict rape in Bosnia and Rwanda,
global media access was not the problem. Rather, the conflict in Rwanda was not in
the sphere of interest of the mainstream media. During the height of the genocide,
information was gathered and disseminated about the killings and rapes by advocacy
groups such as Human Rights Watch, UN peacekeepers, and newspaper journalists
(Power 2003). The lack of prioritization of the conflict in Rwanda by the media
reflected the larger apathy by the world community and the U.S. government to
prioritize Rwanda as part of the national interest. In the spring of 1994, an officer of
the U.S. Defense Department’s African Affairs Bureau was told by his boss, “Look,
if something happens in Rwanda-Burundi, we don’t care. Take it off the list. U.S.
national interest is not involved and we can’t put all these silly humanitarian issues
on lists... Just make it go away” (Power 2003, 342). In addition to viewing Rwanda
as outside of the national interest, implicit racism fueled by deep prejudices and
misconceptions about long-standing bloody ethnic wars in Africa, also altered
people’s values and expectations about the comparative worth of human life and
suffering. In response to the shooting down of Rwandan President Habyarimana’s
plane that first triggered the genocide, Canadian Major General Romeo Dalliare, the
commander of the United Nations peacekeeping forces in Rwanda stated:
Burundi had just blown up, and 50,000 had been killed in a few days... So
when the plane went down, we actually expected around 50,000 plus dead.
Can you imagine having that expectation in Europe? Racism slips in so it
changes our expectations (Power 2003, 350).
Local Network Connections
While geopolitical location and the media affect the levels of transnational advocacy
mobilization, the relationship and interest alignment of local women’s and human
rights groups with transnational advocacy coalitions has the greatest influence upon
levels of mobilization. Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue that strong connections with
local movements are necessary for successful transnational mobilization. In addition
to prior connections with local movements, interest alignment between local and
transnational groups on the prioritization and definition of human rights abuses must
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also occur. Hertel (2006) argues that discord between the priorities of transnational
advocacy coalitions and local movements can result in blocked campaigns and
reprioritization of rights issues, particularly the inclusion of economic and social
rights. In terms of the cases studied in this article, issue alignment means that local
groups and transnational groups are in agreement that sexual violence is a priority
and should be addressed through the transitional justice mechanism of the
international criminal tribunal.
In the former Yugoslavia, relationships between local movements and transna-
tional organizations were strong and had long established ties with women’s and
feminist movements in Europe (Benderly 1997). In 1991, local and transnational
feminist and peace organizations mobilized against the Yugoslavian conflict and the
ethnic cleansing by staging marches, antiwar protests, as well as providing social
services to affected women through shelters and hotlines (Benderly 1997). In
addition, local women’s groups quickly embraced the international criminal
tribunal; during the conflict, these groups actively documented abuses and
gathered evidence to be used at the ICTY (Benderly 1997). Connections between
Yugoslav feminists, NGO workers, and prominent U.S. feminists such as feminist
attorney Catherine MacKinnon also helped establish notable relationships within
the transnational advocacy network that sparked increased attention to a broad base
of U.S. feminists. In October 1992, MacKinnon recounted receiving information
from an American researcher of Croatian and Bosnian descent working with
refugees about the scale of the ethnic cleansing and the widespread rapes
(MacKinnon 1994). Four women’s groups in Bosnia and Croatia subsequently
retained MacKinnon as their counsel and filed a civil lawsuit in U.S. District Court
against Bosnian national Radovan Karadzic under the Alien Tort Claims Act
(Benderly 1997; Posner 1996). The lawsuit was successful, resulting in an award
of $745 million in damages to the plaintiffs for genocide, war crimes, and violations of
international law (Posner 1996).
In Rwanda, local women’s organizations did not have the same depth of
connections with transnational organizations as the Yugoslav groups and did not
have issue alignment over the prioritization of sexual violence justice through the
mechanism of the international criminal tribunal. Rape was not an issue that
Rwandan women’s groups initially mobilized around. After the genocide, AVEGA,
the largest women’s organization in Rwanda, mobilized around the issue of
widowhood and chose not to focus on sexual violence (Rombouts 2006). In 1996,
when women’s and human rights advocacy organizations began to document the
sexual violence that occurred during the genocide, women’s groups were not
interested in the issue of rape, but in social and economic issues such as healthcare
and reparations.
[T]he Rwandan women’s groups made it very clear that they were absolutely
not interested in the issue of international justice for rape victims. And their
rationale for this was that they were basically... trying to rebuild their lives.
There were so many other pressing priorities that they wanted dealt with. And
so they said, “...these women are living in poverty, they have no houses,
they’ve got children of their own and orphans they’re trying to put through
school. They are in dire need... they have lost their husbands... some of them
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are unable to support themselves. If you want to do something useful... give
them things that they can use... housing, schooling, healthcare.”15
At this time, the major human rights organizations were bifurcated between civil
and political rights and economic and social rights.16 Therefore, transnational
advocacy groups had to reshape their prioritization of issues and listen to the needs
of Rwandan women, which meant shifting their focus away from retributive justice.
While most Rwandan women’s organizations did not mobilize around the issue of
rape, not all groups dismissed the issue of criminal justice for sexual violence.
Connections with one social worker from Taba named Godelieve Mukasarasi proved
instrumental in the successful prosecution of rape in the Akayesu case (Neuffer
2002). In 1996, when transnational advocacy groups first traveled to Rwanda to
document the genocidal rapes and most women’s groups did not want to discuss
rape, Godelieve aided the investigators by linking them to rape survivors within her
community of Taba.17 These interviews and documentation of rape in Taba later
constituted the evidence of rape committed in Taba used in the amicus brief
submitted in the Akayesu case (International Centre for Human Rights and
Democratic Development 1997). Once the Akayesu indictment was amended to
include rape charges, Godelieve served as a liaison between the ICTR investigators
and rape survivors in Taba, who later testified at the Akayesu trial and provided
some of the strongest evidence of his complicity in genocide.18
Conclusion
When international criminal judicial outcomes are examined, oftentimes the focus
centers on the available instruments of law or specific characteristics of the tribunal
or court. This article suggests that political will, and the processes by which it is
generated, are also important aspects of the story of legal implementation of judicial
rules. While political will is necessary for all legal implementation, it is particularly
crucial for new legal rules and/or legal rules that have historically been absent from
prosecution, such as the crime of wartime rape. In explaining the variation in rape
prosecution at the ICTY and the ICTR, these case studies highlight how crucial
transnational advocacy was to generating the political will to prosecute. Neverthe-
less, the cases of the ICTY and the ICTR also suggest that transnational advocacy is
no guarantee of successful outcomes and that mobilization is contextually
constrained. Geopolitical location of the conflict, media attention and framing, and
connections with local movements all condition the mobilization and influence of
transnational activist groups.
17 Anonymous leader within women’s human rights movement, Interview with author, September 12,
2008.
18 Anonymous leader within women’s human rights movement, Interview with author, September 12,
2008.
15 Anonymous leader within women’s human rights movement, Interview with author, September 12,
2008.
16 Anonymous leader within women’s human rights movement, Interview with author, September 12,
2008.
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More research should be conducted on the politics behind legal implementation
by examining other factors that condition the generation of political will, by
expanding the focus on the effects of transnational advocacy to other areas beyond
crimes of sexual violence, and by producing more precise measures. Based upon the
large involvement of transnational advocacy groups both in the creation and
increasingly in the function of the ICC (Spees 2003; Broomhall 2003; Schiff 2008),
it is virtually certain that advocacy groups will continue to mobilize around
international criminal judicial bodies. Understanding the dynamics of their
mobilization and their effects on international criminal tribunals and courts is
crucial to understanding prosecutorial outcomes and patterns of legal norm change.
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